

BEYOND COMPLIANCE



Why Regulatory Adherence Does Not Equal Road Transport Safety Performance — And What Actually Works

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1. Executive Summary

Road transport remains one of the most significant and persistently underestimated sources of fatal and serious injury risk across industrial operations. This is particularly evident in sectors such as transportation and logistics, mining and minerals, energy, and utilities, where exposure to vehicle movements is both continuous and operationally critical. Despite decades of regulatory development and the widespread adoption of compliance frameworks, fatal incidents continue to occur with a consistency that cannot be explained by regulatory absence alone.

The central issue is not that regulation is ineffective in its intent. Rather, it is that regulation is frequently misunderstood in its function. Regulatory systems, including those enforced by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, are designed to establish

minimum acceptable standards of operation. They are not designed to manage risk dynamically, nor are they capable of controlling the complex, real-time conditions under which road transport risk materializes.

This distinction is critical. Compliance is a static condition. Risk, by contrast, is dynamic. It is shaped continuously by driver behavior, environmental conditions, vehicle integrity, operational pressure, and organizational controls. Where compliance systems rely on periodic verification and probabilistic enforcement, actual risk exposure evolves moment by moment, largely outside the visibility of those systems.

The result is a structural gap between what is verified and what is occurring. This gap is not theoretical. It is measurable. In the United States alone, commercial vehicles travel in excess of 300 billion miles annually, while

roadside inspections number only in the low millions. Even when inspections occur, violation rates remain materially high, with a significant proportion of vehicles and drivers found to be operating in conditions that warrant removal from service. The implication is unavoidable: a substantial proportion of unsafe conditions exist undetected at any given time.

This paper argues that reliance on compliance as a proxy for safety is fundamentally flawed. It demonstrates that regulatory adherence, while necessary, is insufficient to ensure safe outcomes in high-exposure transport environments. It further proposes that effective road transport safety must be reframed as a problem of assurance rather than compliance. Assurance, in this context, requires continuous visibility, risk-based prioritization, and the capacity to intervene in real time.

2. The Scale and Nature of Road Transport Risk

To understand the limitations of compliance-based systems, it is necessary first to appreciate the scale at which road transport operates. In the United States, the commercial trucking sector comprises approximately 14.9 million vehicles operating across a network that supports nearly every aspect of the national economy. These vehicles collectively travel in the order of 330 billion miles annually. This level of activity represents one of the largest continuous operational exposures managed by any industry.

The magnitude of this exposure is not merely a matter of scale; it is a matter of distribution. Unlike fixed industrial processes, road transport is inherently decentralized. Vehicles operate across vast geographic areas, under varying regulatory jurisdictions, environmental conditions, and levels of supervision. Drivers make decisions in isolation, often under time pressure and with limited direct oversight. This creates a system in which risk is not concentrated but dispersed, and where traditional methods of control are difficult to apply consistently.

The consequences of this exposure are reflected in incident data. Each year, thousands of fatalities in the United States involve large trucks, with total road fatalities consistently approaching or exceeding forty thousand. While commercial vehicles do not account for the majority of incidents, their involvement in fatal crashes is disproportionately significant given the severity of outcomes associated with heavy vehicle operations. The physics of mass and speed ensure that when failures occur, the consequences are often catastrophic.

Globally, the picture is consistent. The World Health Organization estimates that approximately 1.19 million people die annually as a result of road traffic crashes. Within industrial sectors, organizations such as the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers have repeatedly identified driving-related incidents as one of the leading causes of fatalities among their member organizations. These are not isolated findings. They reflect a persistent pattern in which road transport remains one of the most difficult risks to control effectively.

The critical point is that this risk is not static. It is generated continuously through the interaction of human behavior, vehicle condition, and operational context. Fatigue, distraction, speed, mechanical failure, and environmental hazards do not occur in isolation. They combine in complex ways that cannot be fully anticipated or controlled through predefined rules alone.

Any system that seeks to manage this risk must therefore operate at a level that reflects this complexity.

3. The Function and Limitations of Regulatory Compliance

Regulatory frameworks such as those enforced by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration play an essential role in establishing baseline safety conditions. They define the minimum requirements for driver qualification, vehicle maintenance, operational procedures, and hours of service. Without these standards, the industry would lack a consistent foundation upon which to operate.

However, it is important to recognize what these frameworks are, and equally, what they are not.

Regulation is designed to be broadly applicable. It must accommodate a wide range of operators, from large, sophisticated fleets to small, independent carriers. As a result, it is necessarily conservative in its requirements. It defines what is acceptable, not what is optimal. It ensures that operators meet a minimum threshold, but it does not differentiate effectively between average and high-performing organizations.

More fundamentally, regulatory systems are dependent on detection. Compliance is verified through mechanisms such as roadside inspections, audits, and investigations. These mechanisms are inherently limited in their reach. They provide snapshots of performance at specific points in time, rather than continuous insight into operational conditions.

This creates a structural limitation. The effectiveness of a compliance system is constrained by its ability to observe. Where observation is intermittent, compliance becomes a probabilistic construct. Operators may be compliant at the point of inspection, or they may not. What is certain is that the vast

majority of operational activity occurs without direct regulatory oversight.

It is within this context that the assumption of compliance as a proxy for safety begins to break down.

4. The Detection Gap: Exposure Versus Enforcement

The disparity between exposure and enforcement capacity is one of the most critical, yet least acknowledged, aspects of road transport safety.

In the United States, roadside inspections number in the region of three million annually. When set against the backdrop of approximately 330 billion miles travelled by commercial vehicles, this represents an extremely low level of direct oversight. On average, this equates to roughly one inspection for every one hundred thousand miles of travel. While this figure is illustrative rather than precise, it conveys the fundamental imbalance between the scale of operations and the capacity to monitor them.

This imbalance has two important implications.

- First, the probability of any individual journey being inspected is extremely low. For most drivers and vehicles, the vast majority of operational activity will occur without direct regulatory interaction. This does not imply non-compliance, but it does mean that compliance is not actively verified in real time.
- Second, and more importantly, the absence of detection does not equate to the absence of risk. Unsafe conditions can and do exist outside the visibility of enforcement mechanisms. Fatigue may develop over the course of a shift, distraction may occur momentarily, and mechanical issues may arise between inspection intervals. None of these conditions are reliably captured through periodic checks.

When inspections do occur, the data provides further insight into the nature of the problem. Violation rates are consistently significant, with millions of violations recorded annually. A notable proportion of inspections result in vehicles or drivers being placed out of service, indicating the presence of critical safety deficiencies. These are not minor

administrative issues; they are conditions deemed sufficiently serious to warrant immediate removal from operation.

The logical conclusion is unavoidable. If a meaningful proportion of inspected vehicles exhibit critical failures, and if only a small proportion of vehicles are inspected, then a substantial number of unsafe conditions must exist undetected within the broader system.

This is the detection gap. It is the space between what is observed and what is occurring. It is within this space that most risk resides.

5. The Legal Exposure Landscape

A further, increasingly consequential dimension of rising exposure is the rapidly evolving legal environment. As expectations for corporate accountability evolve, the distinction between meeting regulatory minimums and demonstrating effective risk control has become a central issue in litigation, contractual liability, and corporate governance.

Historically, demonstrating compliance served as a primary defence against negligence claims following transport-related incidents. However, courts and regulators have become less tolerant of organizations that rely solely on procedural adherence when systemic control failures can be demonstrated. This shift is driven by several converging trends:

- Expansion of corporate duty of care. Legal frameworks in jurisdictions such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia increasingly recognize that safety obligations extend beyond basic regulatory compliance. Operators are expected to anticipate and manage foreseeable risks, including contractor activities, driver fatigue, and vehicle monitoring failures, through proactive systems of assurance.
- Rise in vicarious and shared liability. Clients and principals who subcontract transport operations are no longer insulated from liability simply because transport is outsourced. Investigations increasingly link deficient oversight, weak contractor monitoring, or unrealistic scheduling practices to negligent management.
- Data-driven accountability. The widespread adoption of telematics, digital logs, and event recorders has raised evidentiary standards.

Post-incident investigations now expect organizations to demonstrate what they knew, when they knew it, and what actions were taken in response. The absence of active monitoring or corrective intervention is increasingly interpreted as a failure of management control rather than an unforeseeable event.

- Regulatory escalation and civil litigation. Agencies such as the FMCSA, OSHA, and state-level authorities are augmenting civil penalties with broader enforcement under general duty clauses. In parallel, civil litigators are using available performance data to challenge organizations that meet formal compliance but cannot show functional control of risk. This combination significantly increases potential financial and reputational exposure.

6. The Compliance Fallacy

The persistence of serious incidents in regulated environments gives rise to what can be described as the compliance fallacy: the belief that adherence to regulatory requirements is sufficient to ensure safe outcomes.

This belief is reinforced by organizational structures and incentives. Compliance is measurable. It can be audited, reported, and verified. It provides a tangible indication of due diligence. For many organizations, demonstrating compliance is both a legal obligation and a reputational necessity.

However, compliance is not synonymous with performance. A system can be fully compliant and still be ineffective in controlling risk. This is particularly true in environments where risk is dynamic and influenced by human behavior.

Consider the example of driver fatigue. Hours-of-service regulations define maximum driving and working limits. Compliance with these limits is necessary, but it does not guarantee that a driver is adequately rested or capable of safe performance. Fatigue is influenced by a range of factors, including sleep quality, circadian rhythms, workload, and individual physiology. These factors cannot be fully captured through prescriptive rules alone.

Similarly, vehicle maintenance standards define minimum requirements for inspection and repair. Compliance ensures that vehicles

meet these requirements at defined intervals. It does not ensure that vehicles remain in optimal condition between those intervals, nor does it guarantee that all defects are identified and addressed in a timely manner.

The same principle applies to broader management systems. Policies and procedures may be documented and implemented, yet their effectiveness depends on how they are applied in practice. A system that exists on paper may not translate into consistent behavior in the field.

The critical insight is that compliance addresses the presence of controls, not their effectiveness. It answers the question, "Is there a system in place?" It does not answer the more important question, "Is the system working as intended under real conditions?"

7. Reframing the Problem: From Compliance to Control

If compliance is insufficient, the question becomes what is required to manage road transport risk effectively.

The answer lies in reframing the problem from one of compliance to one of control.

Control, in this context, refers to the ability to influence outcomes in real time. It requires visibility into operational conditions, the capacity to identify emerging risks, and the ability to intervene before those risks result in incidents.

This represents a fundamental shift in approach.

Where compliance systems are periodic and retrospective, control systems are continuous and proactive. Where compliance relies on external enforcement, control is embedded within the operation itself. Where compliance verifies minimum standards, control seeks to optimize performance.

Achieving this requires the integration of several key elements.

- First, there must be a mechanism for verifying that controls are not only present but effective. This extends beyond documentation to include field-based assessment and validation of actual practices.
- Second, risk must be prioritized based on exposure. Not all operations carry the same level of risk, and resources must be

allocated accordingly. This requires a clear understanding of factors such as route characteristics, operating environments, and historical performance.

- Third, there must be continuous visibility into driver behavior and vehicle condition. Advances in telematics and monitoring technologies have made this increasingly feasible. However, data alone is insufficient. It must be interpreted and acted upon in a timely manner.
- Finally, there must be a closed-loop system of intervention. Identified risks must lead to specific actions, whether in the form of driver coaching, operational adjustments, or escalation of issues. Without this feedback loop, monitoring becomes an exercise in observation rather than control.

8. Implications for Industry

For organizations operating in high-risk sectors, the implications are significant.

Reliance on compliance as the primary mechanism for managing road transport risk is unlikely to deliver the desired outcomes. While compliance remains necessary, it should be viewed as a foundation rather than a solution.

Organizations must recognize that risk is largely generated and managed at the operational level. It is influenced by decisions made by drivers, supervisors, and managers in real time. Effective control requires engagement at this level, supported by systems

that provide visibility and enable intervention.

This has particular relevance for contractor management. Many organizations rely on third-party providers for transport services. Prequalification processes play an important role in establishing baseline capability. However, they do not provide ongoing assurance of performance.

To manage contractor risk effectively, organizations must extend their oversight beyond initial approval. This includes verifying that contractors operate in accordance with required standards, monitoring their performance over time, and intervening where necessary. Without this, the organization remains exposed to risks that are outside its direct control.

9. Conclusion

Road transport safety is often approached as a problem of compliance. This perspective is understandable, given the prominence of regulatory frameworks and the emphasis placed on meeting legal requirements. However, it is ultimately insufficient.

The evidence is clear. The scale of exposure far exceeds the capacity for enforcement. Violation rates remain significant when inspections occur. Risk is dynamic and influenced by factors that cannot be fully controlled through prescriptive rules.

In this context, compliance cannot be relied upon as a proxy for safety. It provides

a necessary baseline, but it does not ensure effective control of risk.

A more effective approach requires a shift in mindset. Road transport safety must be understood as a problem of control operating within a high-exposure environment. Addressing this requires systems that are capable of monitoring, interpreting, and influencing behavior in real time.

The organizations that recognize and act on this distinction will be better positioned to manage risk effectively. Those that do not will continue to operate within the limits of compliance, with outcomes that reflect those limits.

10. Final Statement

A system can be fully compliant and still fail.

A system that controls risk, however, is one that performs.



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